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ABSTRACT
There is an extensive literature on the extent to which public health insurance coverage through
Medicaid induces less private health insurance coverage. However, little is known about the effect
of other components of the health care safety net in crowding out private coverage. We examine the
effect of Medicaid and uncompensated care provided by clinics and hospitals on insurance coverage.
We construct a long panel of metropolitan area and state-level data on hospital uncompensated care
and free and reduced price care offered by Federally Qualified Health Centers. We match this
information to individual level data on coverage from the Current Population Survey for two distinct
groups: children aged 14 and under and single, childless adults aged 18 to 64. Our results provide
mixed evidence on the extent of crowd-out. Hospital uncompensated care does not appear to crowd-
out health insurance coverage and health center uncompensated care appears to crowd-out private
coverage for adults and, in some specifications, children.
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1.  Introduction 
An issue that has attracted a great deal of attention in recent years is whether changes in 
Medicaid eligibility and the recent State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) 
expansions have crowded-out private employer-provided health insurance coverage.
1  Less well 
understood, however, is the role of the health care safety net in affecting low-income workers’ 
decisions to accept employer-provided health insurance for themselves and their families.  From 
the standpoint of low-income workers, a more dependable safety net may induce individuals to 
accept employment without health insurance or decline employer-provided coverage for 
themselves or their dependents, particularly in the face of rising health insurance premiums and 
rising cost-sharing that increasingly characterizes employer-sponsored health insurance (Gabel et 
al. 2004).  A recent study by the Commonwealth Fund examining uninsured workers supports 
these contentions, suggesting that the uninsured often believe they can “get around insurance” by 
going to free clinics (Perry, Kennel, and Castillo 2000, p. 17).   
From the standpoint of small employers, the availability of safety net health care services 
may induce firms, particularly smaller firms, firms hiring predominantly low-wage, low-skill 
workers, or firms in economically depressed areas, not to offer health insurance to workers.  Data 
from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) from the Agency for Healthcare Research 
and Quality (AHRQ) suggest that in 1998 only 54.7% of employees in low-wage establishments 
were offered insurance and only 29.9% of employees took up coverage in these firms (AHRQ, 
2000).  Further, data from a national employer survey indicate that among small firms (3-199 
employees) only 35% of firms with a large fraction of low-wage employees offered health 
                                                 
1 Publications on this topic include Cutler and Gruber 1996; Dubay and Kenney 1997; Blumberg, et al. 
2000; Yazici and Kaestner 2000; and Lo Sasso and Buchmueller 2004.    
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insurance (Kaiser Family Foundation and HRET 2000).  This occurred despite the fact that the 
offer rate among all small firms rose from 59% to 67% between 1996 and 2000.  Moreover, 
evidence from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) indicates that among 
persons who lose health insurance coverage, 60% reported that the reason for losing coverage is 
that insurance is too expensive and they cannot afford health insurance.  Thus, it is clear that 
among low-income workers and small, low-wage firms, health insurance coverage decisions may 
respond strongly to financial conditions.  It is these workers and firms for whom community 
safety net services may represent a viable alternative to traditional coverage options.  
Data from the Census Bureau indicate that in 2004 there were 45.8 million people 
lacking health insurance.  While many of these people may be eligible for public programs, this 
number represents the individuals most at risk of using safety net health care services should 
they become ill.  Recent studies have suggested that the care provided by health care safety net 
providers has grown in recent years.  For example, 41% of 8.3 million Federally Qualified 
Health Center (FQHC) patients in 1998 were uninsured, and between 1990 and 1998 FQHCs 
witnessed a 60% increase in the number of uninsured patients (Bureau of Primary Health Care 
1998).  In 2000 nearly $21 billion in uncompensated care was provided by short-term general 
non-federal hospitals.   
Few studies have attempted to relate private insurance take-up to characteristics of local 
health care markets.  The prior studies in this area suffer from notable shortcomings, including 
measurement problems that did not allow for precise measures of the safety net in a particular 
area, the inability to deal adequately with endogeneity concerns, and short time periods of 
analysis.    
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Our study uses data from March Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Demographic 
File for the years 1991 to 2001 to measure health insurance coverage over the years 1990 to 
2000.  The CPS data are combined with detailed measures on local health care facilities to 
examine the link between safety net characteristics and private health insurance coverage.  Our 
primary safety net measures include total hospital uncompensated care (UC) derived from the 
American Hospital Association’s annual survey of hospitals and UC provided by FQHCs (both 
per population under age 65).  We examine the robustness of our results to the potential 
presence of omitted variables that affect both insurance coverage and UC levels.  We consider 
likely biases to our results in this situation, and propose several potential instrumental variables 
that we use in alternative estimates.  Our results suggest that the impact of safety net care on 
health insurance coverage is small.  Hospital uncompensated care does not appear to crowd-out 
health insurance coverage though health center uncompensated care appears to crowd-out 
private coverage for adults and, in some specifications, children.   
 
2.  Prior Literature  
Rask and Rask (2000) conducted two separate analyses to examine the role of public 
hospitals and public programs in health insurance coverage decisions.  First, they used the 1987 
National Medical Expenditure Survey (NMES) data to examine how the presence of public 
hospitals affected health insurance coverage.  They found that among individuals with income 
between 100 and 200 percent of the poverty line, the presence of a public hospital crowded out 
nearly 11 percent of persons who would otherwise be privately insured.  Among middle-income 
individuals (income between 200 and 400 percent of the poverty line), public hospitals crowded 
out nearly 4 percent of persons who would otherwise be privately insured.  The second  
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component of their study used data from the 1989 and 1992 National Health Interview Survey 
(NHIS) to measure the effects on health coverage of residing in a state with an uncompensated 
care funding pool and of AFDC and Medicaid program characteristics.  The authors found that 
uncompensated care funds were associated with a higher rate of uninsurance and lower rates of 
Medicaid and private insurance.   
Their analysis, while the first of its kind and innovative in many respects, is weak for 
several reasons.  First, the authors did not have access to the geographic location of the NMES 
respondents.  The authors were only able to match their data to a rough indicator for proximity 
to a public hospital.  Moreover, without geographic identifiers the authors were unable to 
control for other state characteristics that can affect health insurance coverage; they were 
similarly unable to control for Medicaid eligibility.  As a result, their findings regarding the 
impact of public hospitals on health insurance coverage call for more convincing evidence.  
Second, in their analysis using the NHIS, the presence of an uncompensated care reimbursement 
fund provides no information on the generosity of statewide support of safety net providers and 
safety net care in general.  In addition, uncompensated care funds are present in only a handful 
of states and they differ sharply in their size.  Finally, by covering the period 1987-1992, the 
study misses several key policy changes that have potentially had a dramatic effect on safety net 
providers.  These include the dramatic increase in the Medicaid disproportionate share program, 
the SCHIP expansions, and welfare reform, all of which were likely to result in changes to 
provider, employer, and employee behavior.   
Research by Herring (2005) uses data from the Community Tracking Study (CTS) to 
examine the effect of access to charity care on health insurance coverage.  Herring finds that 
access to charity care is negatively associated with private health insurance coverage of low  
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income individuals.  To measure “access” to local charity care services the author uses the 
market-level average (market refers to the 60 market areas surveyed in the CTS) among the 
uninsured for the question concerning whether the uninsured person had cost-related difficulty 
obtaining health care.  While this measure of access to charity care does incorporate all potential 
sources of care individuals may receive (indeed it is positively correlated with hospital charity 
care provision and FQHC concentration), it does not present a readily interpretable policy 
“lever” and it is likely to incorporate a lot of other factors not related to safety net services, such 
as health status.  The author argues that the market average of reported access to care reflects the 
“underlying altruism of people towards the uninsured” (Herring 2005, p. 239), but this argument 
is suspect because the difficulty that uninsured individuals face getting health care will depend 
on who the uninsured are and how many such individuals there are in the market.  Despite using 
multiple years of data on individuals in each market, the author does not include fixed market 
effects leaving the reader to wonder whether unobserved factors are confounding the relationship 
between coverage and access to safety net care.    
Chernew, Cutler, and Keenan (2005) study the relationship between health insurance 
premium increases and coverage and find that rising health insurance premiums in areas with 
greater availability of charity care, measured as public and teaching hospital beds per capita, is 
associated with larger declines in coverage.  The result suggests that charity care is potentially 
used as a substitute for private health insurance coverage.   
 
3.  Theoretical Considerations 
Hospitals and clinics provide uncompensated care because it is part of their mission and 
in certain circumstances they face statutory requirements to provide care.  However, funding  
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from various sources—federal, state and local governments and foundations—can at the margin 
encourage hospitals and clinics to provide safety net care.  These governmental levers are 
important tools in ensuring that care is provided for those without insurance.  By making it less 
costly to provide uncompensated care, these government transfers are expected to induce greater 
provision of uncompensated care. 
The provision of uncompensated care by health centers and hospitals then in turn affects 
individual and firm decisions.  Safety net care can affect individual decisions to take up 
employer offered insurance as individuals weigh the attributes and costs of alternative health 
care arrangements.  Employer provided health insurance is likely to have greater costs than 
Medicaid or safety net care both in terms of premiums and out of pocket costs such as 
deductibles and co-payments.  However, it may have more favorable attributes such as shorter 
waiting times and more certain receipt of care.  A more extensive safety net, provided by health 
clinics and hospitals, may induce individuals to conclude that the cost of employer provided 
coverage is too high.   
The employer offer decision also depends on safety net care.  Firms must aggregate the 
preferences of their workers.  Firms must decide whether the health benefits they provide allow 
them to lower their offered wages enough to pay for the firm share of premiums, and decide how 
the tax advantages and lower group cost of providing health insurance affect the willingness of 
workers to accept lower wages.  This willingness is affected by income and other determinants of 
employees demand for health care.  Thus, the insurance offer rate and the rate of insurance 
coverage will depend on the characteristics of people in the geographic area from which the 
firms hire.  The willingness of workers to accept lower wages in exchange for health insurance 
will also depend on the other health care options available to workers.  Those other options  
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include safety net care at clinics and hospitals.  The extent of this safety net will then likely 
affect the decision of firms to provide health insurance as well as the terms under which this 
insurance is offered.    
 
4.  Institutional Background 
The health care safety net in the US can be characterized as a multitude of providers that 
are supported by a diverse and often haphazard array of funding mechanisms.  The fraction of 
Americans without health insurance in 2004 is slightly higher at 15.7% from the 14.8% recorded 
in 1987.  The uninsured, as well as many under-insured and Medicaid insured patients, often 
depend on safety net providers to meet their health care needs.  During this period of change in 
the number of uninsured persons in the 1990s, health care industry restructuring and changes in 
the public financing of health care providers may have significantly affected safety net providers.   
 
A. Safety Net Providers 
Defining what is encompassed by the health care safety net is a challenge.  In a report 
issued by the Institute of Medicine (IOM) on the health care safety net (IOM 2000), the IOM 
committee used a general approach, defining the safety net as “providers that organize and 
deliver a significant level of health care and other related services to uninsured, Medicaid and 
other vulnerable patients.”  This definition, however, does not lend itself to the measurement of 
the extent of safety net care that is provided.   
Urban public hospitals and academic medical centers (AHC) devote a large fraction of 
their health care provision to Medicaid and uninsured populations (Baxter and Mechanic 1997;  
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Mann et al. 1997).
2  While private not for profit (NFP) hospitals vary significantly in their roles 
as safety net providers, as a group these hospitals also form an important part of the safety net.  
In 1994, private NFPs (not including private AHCs) provided nearly 50% of all uncompensated 
hospital care and over 50% of all Medicaid hospital care.  Given the large amount of 
uncompensated care that is provided throughout the hospital industry, it is clearly not appropriate 
to use arbitrary classifications of hospitals by public status or teaching status alone to determine 
safety net health care provision.
3 
FQHCs have a clear mission to serve the poor (Hawkins and Rosenbaum 1998).  Based 
on year 2000 data, nearly 4 million of FQHCs’ 9.6 million patients are uninsured (almost 10% of 
all uninsured), while another 3.2 million are Medicaid recipients (approximately 10% of all 
Medicaid recipients).  Of the nearly 40 million patient encounters occurring at FQHCs, half are 
for primary care visits with an MD physician.  
 
B. Safety Net Policies and Market Forces 
A number of policy and market factors have affected the environment in which safety net 
                                                 
2 Approximately 70% of urban public hospital inpatient days in 1995 were for Medicaid or self pay 
patients.  Public hospitals also provide a large volume of outpatient services to safety net populations.  77% of their 
outpatient and emergency room visits were for Medicaid (34%) and self-pay (43%) patients.  Academic Health 
Centers (AHCs) also provide a large amount of care to safety net populations (Mann et al., 1997).  In their markets, 
AHCs provide 37% of uncompensated (hospital) care and 31.5% of Medicaid (hospital) care, while only 
representing 7.3% of hospitals.  For public AHCs (3.5% of hospitals) the corresponding figures are 26.2% of 
uncompensated care, 19.8% of Medicaid (Reuter and Gaskin 1997).   
3 In a study of how safety net hospitals fared between 1990 and 1997, Zuckerman et al. (2001) identified 
three groups of safety net hospitals based on whether they contribute a high fraction of the market’s total 
uncompensated care or whether a high fraction of the hospital’s costs are uncompensated or both.  Hospitals 
displaying both attributes remained the most important providers of uncompensated care and, despite experiencing 
stagnant growth in admissions and losses in the number of births relative to non-safety net hospitals, virtually never 
closed.  Hospitals with high market share continued their important role, but did reduce the share of the 
uncompensated care they provided relative to non-safety net hospitals.  These facilities also appeared to be the most 
attractive merger partners, indicating that hospital involvement as a substantial market provider of indigent care is 
not a barrier to merger. Hospitals that had a high ratio of UC to costs were generally smaller and most at risk of 
closing.    
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providers operate.  Medicaid disproportionate share payments to hospitals increased dramatically 
in the early 1990s from $1.4 billion in 1990 to $17.5 billion in 1992 (Coughlin, Ku, and Kim 
2000).  Since the late 1980s, private HMO market shares have risen from 19% to 35% in 2001 
(Foster Higgins/Mercer 1998, 2003).  Since 1994, Medicaid managed care has risen from 14% to 
57% of beneficiaries.  Welfare reform and the Balanced Budget Act (BBA) of 1997, which 
ushered in the SCHIP expansions, have transformed Medicaid eligibility and provider 
reimbursement policies.   
Federal and state subsidy programs for health care providers are intended to make up the 
difference between payments safety net providers receive and the costs incurred through caring 
for the uninsured.  Medicaid and to a lesser extent Medicare DSH payments are the primary 
method for the federal government and states to subsidize hospitals believed to be burdened by 
indigent care.  States vary considerably in the extent to which they availed themselves of 
loopholes in the early law and subsequent reform efforts, and it is not at all clear that need has 
played a primary role in determining funding levels (Coughlin and Liska 1998).
4  States also 
vary dramatically in the fraction of federal DSH dollars that are actually provided to hospitals 
versus other state spending priorities (Ku and Coughlin 1995).
5   
                                                 
4 The history of the DSH program is long and complicated.  Although the DSH program was enacted in the 
early 1980s, states were slow to capitalize on the program until the late 1980s when individual states began to 
develop creative methods to use the DSH program to increase their Medicaid funding (Fishman and Bentley 1997).  
Other states quickly copied the approaches of pioneers and DSH payments to states grew dramatically.  The federal 
government passed reforms in 1991 and 1993 to attempt to control the growth in DSH payments.  DSH payments 
leveled off after 1993 and subsequently fell after 1996 from around $18 billion to around $15 billion where they 
have remained since.  However, state responses to the 1993 reforms varied considerably.  Some states increased the 
number of types of providers to whom they made DSH payments, including mental health providers, for example.  
Other states were unable or unwilling to spend their full DSH allotments.  For example, Colorado intentionally kept 
its DSH spending low to avoid the possible need to make up for lost federal DSH payments should the federal 
government cut DSH funding (Coughlin and Liska 1998).  Michigan, by contrast, reduced DSH payments because 
prior to the 1993 reforms the state was retaining federal DSH revenues as general revenues instead of using them for 
safety net providers (GAO 1994).   
5 Closely related to state DSH programs are state uncompensated care pool systems, which are designed to  
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FQHCs have historically been financed through cost-based reimbursement from 
Medicaid, federal grants from the Bureau of Primary Health Care (BPHC), and in some cases 
state and local subsidies.  Some evidence suggests that cost-based reimbursement has allowed 
FQHCs to expand their provision of health care to the uninsured through cost-shifting (Ku, 
Wade, and Dodds 1996).  The BBA and its subsequent refinement, the Benefits Improvement 
and Protection Act (BIPA) of 2000, introduced the gradual phase-out of cost-based 
reimbursement.  Federal grants to FQHCs have grown steadily throughout the 1990s from 
roughly $550 million in 1990 to $925 million in 1999 (National Association of Community 
Health Centers 1999).   
State and local funding for the safety net is highly variable across the country (Meyer et 
al. 1999), and often can be used to make up for low federal subsidies (Norton and Lipson 1998).  
Local sources of non-operating revenues for hospitals and other safety net providers are widely 
variable, but can be aided by a few factors.  One factor is ability of the county to have taxing 
authority and the willingness to use discretionary funds to support safety net providers (Meyer et 
al. 1999).  The same is true for city-based public health departments.  Many communities such as 
New York and Los Angeles have a long history of supporting safety net institutions, while others 
are less supportive (Baxter and Mechanic 1997).  
Growing use of managed care in Medicaid heightens competition among providers over 
Medicaid patients, which represents a potential threat to safety net providers because Medicaid 
revenues often comprise an important portion of total revenues for safety net providers and have 
                                                                                                                                                             
reimburse hospitals that provide a large fraction of care to the uninsured.  During the 1990s, five states had UC pool 
systems (Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, Maryland, and Virginia).  The presence of a UC pool was used as 
an independent variable in the previously mentioned study by Rask and Rask (2000) and found to be significantly 
related to the provision of UC, at least cross-sectionally.    
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historically helped such providers cross-subsidize health care to the uninsured (Norton and 
Lipson 1998).
6  Similar to the Medicaid market, private purchasers of health care have 
aggressively pursued cost reductions through capitated managed care contracts.  Studies have 
indicated that increasing private HMO penetration has been associated with increased 
price-based competition.  Such competition potentially threatens the private pay patient base, 
which is frequently used to subsidize the cost of treating the uninsured (Norton and Lipson 
1998).  In addition, price competition in the private payer realm can make Medicaid 
reimbursement rates look relatively more attractive, which can heighten competition for 
Medicaid patients among safety net providers (Fishman and Bentley 1997).  Studies have 
suggested that increased private HMO penetration have been associated with relatively greater 
reductions in patient volumes at hospitals serving predominantly safety net populations (Gaskin 
1997).  
 
5.  Data and Methods   
We combine information from four large datasets as well as several smaller datasets to 
produce our estimates.  We focus on a long time period, the years 1990-2000, during which there 
were substantial changes in our key safety net measures.  The study focuses on two distinct 
groups that could plausibly have their health insurance decisions affected by the health care 
safety net: children 14 and under and single, childless adults aged 18-64.
7  
                                                 
6 Although some studies have shown that some safety net providers fared better than anticipated after 
increases in Medicaid managed care (Hoag, Norton, and Rajan 2000), other studies have indicated mixed successes 
on the part of safety net providers in response to the Medicaid managed care pressures (North and Lipson 1998).  
Campbell and Ahern (1993) also found that California hospitals with greater Medicaid and Medicare contractual 
allowances (i.e., lower payment rates) provided less uncompensated care.  Davidoff, et al. (2000) found that higher 
Medicaid managed care penetration was associated with lower UC for private NFP hospitals. 
7 One advantage of an analysis of children is that Cutler and Gruber (1996) found that fairly straightforward  
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A. Health Insurance Coverage Data 
We rely on the health insurance coverage data from the Current Population Survey 
because it is the only data source with comparable questions asked over the time period we 
analyze.  The CPS also provides a very large sample with good geographic detail facilitating our 
analysis of local health care safety nets.  In the March Annual Demographic File, the CPS reports 
responses to questions about coverage through various sources for the previous year.  We use the 
files for survey years 1991-2001 to obtain data for the reference years 1990-2000.  The data 
allow us to examine whether respondents had health insurance coverage of any type, as well as 
whether the coverage was public, or private, and whether private coverage was employer or 
union provided.   
 
B.  Geographic Unit of Analysis 
Only hospitals and clinics within a reasonable traveling distance from a family constitute 
the local health care safety net.  Thus, an analysis of state data might be less appropriate because 
persons in one area of a state are unlikely to be affected by hospitals and clinics in another area 
of the state.  On the other hand, an analysis of counties or metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) 
could lead to mismeasured key variables as people are able to travel to neighboring counties, 
especially individuals who live near county borders, or because a smaller number of safety net 
institutions could exacerbate measurement errors in the data.  Thus, we use MSAs as our primary 
unit of analysis and re-estimate our models using state-level data for a variety of measurement 
                                                                                                                                                             
methods like those that we employ here yielded very similar estimates to their later approach that accounted for the 
Medicaid coverage of the entire family.   We also estimated specifications for the child sample including family 
Medicaid eligibility and found little change in our uncompensated care coefficient estimates.    
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related reasons that will be clear as our key measures are described below.   
MSAs are defined by commuting patterns and thus provide a sensible local geographic 
unit.  In addition, using  MSAs provides us with a large sample of independent observations.  In 
all, 281 MSAs are identified over our sample period.  The definition of some MSAs changed in 
the CPS, starting with the data for 1995.
8  When there is a substantial change in the definition, 
we take the redefined MSA to be a different geographic unit in the empirical analysis.  Only 
MSAs that satisfy several additional criteria are included.  Specifically, we only include MSAs 
defined by counties to facilitate matching
9, MSAs where the CPS sample frame is close to the 
MSA definition, and MSAs without suppressed hospital data.  We end up with 1568 MSA-years 
of data.  In order to match our various data sources together we rely on zip code and county 
information.  Then, using files that link zip codes with counties and counties with MSAs, we are 
able to use either county or zip code information to link our data sources.  In the cases where we 
use state level variables (usually in constructing instruments used in IV estimates) we combine 
state variables for multi-state MSAs using state shares of the population.   
As mentioned, we provide a complementary set of analyses that use the state as the unit 
of analysis for the health care safety net.  State policies have a strong influence on providers 
through a variety of mechanisms.  Within federal guidelines, states set Medicaid eligibility and 
provider reimbursement rates for Medicaid services.  State governments set DSH policies that 
can offset to varying degrees the impact of indigent care provision.  States also provide the 
regulatory environment that can affect provider decisions regarding care provision.  
                                                 
8 For the years 1990 to 1994 the 1983 OMB definition of MSAs is used, while from 1995 to 2000 the CPS 
uses the 1993 OMB definition.  
9 While elimination of MSAs not strictly defined by counties in unlikely to bias our estimates, it does 
necessitate eliminating a number of large northeastern MSAs, including Boston.  Our state-level analyses do not 
require these exclusions.   
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Additionally, using state-level data eliminates concerns with the MSA-level analysis that only a 
subset of MSAs can be analyzed given the difficulties of linking data to MSAs not defined by 
counties, changes in MSA definitions over time, and AHA confidentiality restrictions which 
eliminate certain MSAs.   
 
C.  Hospital Safety Net Care 
Data on hospitals come from the American Hospital Association’s Annual Survey of 
hospitals for the years 1990-2000.  Because of the confidential nature of the financial measures, 
individual hospital values are aggregated to the MSA level using county codes.  To preserve 
hospital confidentiality and to insure data integrity, MSAs with fewer than three hospitals or 
MSAs where more than 50 percent of hospitals had estimated values for uncompensated care 
(due to non-reporting) were not provided by the AHA.  For the state-level data, these restrictions 
are not binding and we have a full set of aggregate state data for the 50 states (plus DC) for the 
years 1990-2000.   
All short-term, general, non-federal hospitals are included in the state-level variables.  
We measure uncompensated care (UC) as the sum of bad debt, which is defined as, “the 
provision for actual or expected uncollectibles resulting from the extension of credit,” and 
charity care, which is defined as, “health services that were never expected to result in cash 
inflows¼ [which] results from a provider’s policy to provide health care services free of charge 
to individuals who meet certain financial criteria.”  Uncompensated care is reported on the basis 
of forgone revenue, at “list” price.  Because of contractual arrangements, hospitals rarely receive 
the full charged price for services, thus list price does not reflect the true cost associated with  
 
16 
providing the services.  To correct for this problem, we convert hospital UC values from charges 
to expenses by multiplying by a hospital specific ratio of costs to charges (RCC): [total expense 
– bad debt expense]/[Gross patient revenues + other operating revenues].
10  All of our dollar 
figures for safety net care and relevant instruments are in real terms and are per MSA/state 
resident under age 65.
11 
 
D.  Community Health Centers 
We incorporate information on UC provided by FQHCs during the years 1990-2000.  The 
primary data sources we use are the Bureau Common Reporting Requirements (BCRR) data (for 
the years 1990-1995) and the Uniform Data System (UDS) files (for the years 1996 to 2000).  
UDS and BCRR data are provided by grantees of several primary care system development 
programs administered by the Bureau of Primary Health Care.  The program we are most 
interested in is the Community Health Center Program (Section 330 of the Public Health Service 
Act).
12  Centers report extensive information on the number and types of people who receive 
services at the center.  The data also contain extensive financial information on types of 
expenditures and sources of revenue.   
The key variables we extract are the dollar value of sliding payment scale adjustments 
(discounts) provided by a center and the dollar value of bad debt written-off by a center.  These 
variables are then summed and calculated on a per capital basis for the MSA/state.  The resulting 
                                                 
10 As a check on this specification we also use an alternative formulation of the RCC: Net patient 
revenue/Total gross patient revenue and find comparable results.   
11 We constructed MSA-specific and state-specific medical price CPIs to adjust dollar values for inflation.  
Further details are available in the Data Appendix.   
12 The BCRR and UDS also include information about the Health Care Services for the Homeless Program 
and the Migrant Health Center Program. In addition, BCRR includes information about the Family Planning 
Program and the National Health Service Corps, while the UDS includes information about the Public Housing 
Primary Care Program.    
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variable, which we call center uncompensated care is the key clinic safety net variable that we 
use.  All variables (except for number of centers) are also adjusted at the center level to exclude 
migrants, homeless, and users 65 or older.
13 
 
E.  Medicaid and SCHIP 
We control for Medicaid/SCHIP eligibility for children in our analyses because eligibility 
for public insurance may affect private coverage through the same mechanisms described above 
for safety net care.  There is an extensive literature examining the effect of public eligibility on 
private coverage.  We are also interested in the effect of the safety net on coverage of any kind, 
and Medicaid/SCHIP is a key determinant of any coverage.  Because our childless adult 
subsample is generally unlikely to be Medicaid eligible, we exclude public coverage as a 
dependent variable and Medicaid eligibility as an independent variable in the adult regressions.   
We calculate an indicator variable for Medicaid/SCHIP eligibility using a detailed 
eligibility calculator that accounts for the Medicaid expansions, waivers, SCHIP provisions, and 
other features of that Medicaid and SCHIP eligibility.  Following much of the literature (e.g. 
Cutler and Gruber 1996; Currie and Gruber 1996a, 1996b; Ham and Shore-Sheppard 2005), we 
are worried about the potential endogeneity of individual eligibility.  Eligibility is a function of 
family income and family structure, which are likely to have independent effects on health 
insurance offers and take-up.  Eligibility is also likely to be measured with error.  Thus, we 
                                                 
13 For each center, we have information on the proportion of all users who are migrants, homeless and older 
than 65.  All variables of interest are multiplied by the proportion of users in a given center that are not migrants, 
homeless, or older than 65.  In the BCRR data years (1990 to 1995) family planning information is sometimes 
included along with other program information in the financial data.  Where possible, we proportionately reduce 
financial flows by the fraction of users who use family planning services.  Financial information is reported at the 
center level, not the site level.  In the small share of cases where sites are outside the MSA (or for the state-level 
data, in other states), we proportionately adjust the financial data.    
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instrument an individual’s actual eligibility with a simulated eligibility measure.     
We calculate two different simulated eligibility measures, one based on a national sample 
of family characteristics, and a second based on an MSA-specific sample of family 
characteristics.  The first measure, which we call national simulated eligibility, is similar to that 
used in most past work.  The second measure, which we call MSA-level simulated eligibility, 
uses a distribution of family characteristics (income in particular) that varies across states, but 
not over time, thus, should better reflect the wage and income distributions that are very different 
across states.  For example, incomes are much higher in New York State than in Texas, and 
accounting for this difference can substantially affect the calculated fraction of a state’s 
population affected by a Medicaid expansion.  We construct a comparable measure using state-
level distribution of characteristics for our state-level estimates.  We also make some potential 
improvements over past simulated eligibility measures.  In particular, we will account for the fact 
that it is uncommon for parents to receive the AFDC/TANF child care deduction.   
For national simulated eligibility we use the family incomes (and other characteristics) 
for a random sample of 5000 children of a single year of age (0 to 14) from the entire urban U.S. 
and the entire sample period 1990-2000 (with dollar values indexed by the CPI-U).  We then use 
our eligibility calculator to determine the Medicaid/SCHIP eligibility of each of these children as 
it would have been in each of the years 1990-2000 in each of the 51 states. The calculated mean 
eligibility for a given age, state and year is merged into our dataset and matched by 
age×state×year to individuals in the dataset. 
For MSA-level (state-level) simulated eligibility we use the MSA (state) level 
distribution of income and other characteristics for all families with children under 18.  We 
sample up to 500 children from the entire period 1990-2000 from each MSA (state).  We then  
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use our eligibility calculator to determine what the Medicaid/SCHIP eligibility of each of these 
children would have been in that MSA (state) in each of the years 1990-2000 if the child were a 
given single year of age, 0 to 14.   The calculated mean eligibility for a given age, MSA (state) 
and year is merged into our dataset and matched by age×MSA×year (age×state×year) to 
individuals in the dataset.  
 
F.  Other Individual Characteristics and Controls 
We control for a number of other individual and state characteristics in our regression 
estimates.  These characteristics include age, race, education (of each parent for the children), 
work status (number of working parents for children), and whether the individual (or parent) 
works for a large firm.  In addition for the child regressions we include type of family (only 
mother present, only father present) and family size.   
We include as controls several characteristics of areas that vary by MSA and year 
including the MSA-level unemployment rate and per capita income.  We also include the private 
HMO penetration rate and the state Medicaid managed care rate.  For state-level analyses, 
unemployment, per capita income, and HMO penetration are all included measured at the state 
level.  HMO and Medicaid managed care penetration are described in detail in the data appendix.   
We also tried specifications for children that included MSA-level family Medicaid eligibility, but 
the variable was not significant and did not appreciably affect the UC variable coefficients. 
 
6.  Econometric Estimates 
We analyze a large repeated cross-section sample of children from the CPS over the 
1990-2000 period.  Our main specification relates coverage to Medicaid eligibility, safety net  
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variables, other state variables, demographic variables, and other characteristics and can be 
written as: 
 
COVERAGEimt = ￿ + ￿1 CENTER_UCmt  + ￿2 HOSPITAL_UCmt  +              
￿3PUBLIC_ELIGIBILITYimt +￿4 MSAm + ￿5 YEARt + ￿6 Ximt + ￿7 Zmt + ￿imt . 
 
Here COVERAGEimt is an indicator variable for health insurance coverage of a given type for 
child i in MSA m and year t.  Our main measures of coverage are private health insurance 
coverage and any health insurance coverage.  CENTER_UCmt is one of our measures of the 
health center safety net provided at the MSA level.  In most cases, the measure is sliding 
discounts plus bad debt written-off per capita for the MSA and year.  HOSPITAL_UCmt is one of 
our measures of the hospital safety net care provided at the MSA level.  In most cases this 
measure is charity care plus bad debt per capita, adjusted for the difference between hospital list 
and actual prices, for the MSA and year.  PUBLIC_ELIGimt  is Medicaid or SCHIP eligibility.  X 
includes individual characteristics (and family characteristics for children).  Z includes the MSA 
and state by year level variables including unemployment rates and per capita income.     
We will generally include MSA indicator variables when we use MSA simulated 
Medicaid eligibility, but report some estimates without them.  We do not include MSA×year 
interactions because with them our safety net variables would not be identified.  The results in 
Cutler and Gruber (1996, p. 406) and Lo Sasso and Buchmueller (2004, p. 1072) suggest that this 
identifying restriction is not too worrisome as they found that adding state×year interactions had 
little effect on their estimates.  Our state-level regressions are structured in a similar fashion.   
 Like all of the previous work in this area, we use linear probability models.  However,  
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we have explored the sensitivity of our estimates and examined how well the linearity 
assumption seems to approximate the data.
14  In addition, below we compare probit average 
derivatives to linear probability model coefficients for some of our key specifications.  These 
estimates are reported in Table 10.  
 
A.  Descriptive Statistics 
Tables 1 through 3 report descriptive statistics for the data we use.  Table 1 reports 
overall means for our MSA-level data sets for insurance coverage and policy variables over the 
1990-2000 period, along with standard deviations and the range of the variables.  (A comparable 
table for the state-level data set is contained in Appendix Table A.)  We have over 182,000 
children ages 14 or less in our child dataset and over 151,000 adults in our unmarried, childless 
adult dataset.  Overall, just over 14 percent of children have no health insurance coverage and 65 
percent have private coverage.  Nearly 25 percent of children have public health insurance 
coverage, while 36 percent of children are eligible for Medicaid.  For adults, nearly 28 percent of 
unmarried childless adults aged 18 to 64 have no insurance while roughly 64 percent have 
private coverage.   
Hospital uncompensated care averages $90 annually per capita.  Health center 
                                                 
14 Ham and Shore-Sheppard (2005) found little difference between linear probability model estimates and 
logit derivatives when estimating similar, but simpler, models of insurance coverage.  We have done some 
explorations of relaxing the linearity assumption.  In particular, we have tried discretizing variables where it is 
sensible and adding squares of the remaining continuous variables.  For the safety net variables and some other 
continuous variables we included (variable-overall mean)
2 so that the coefficient on the linear term retained its 
interpretation as the marginal effect at the means.  We then added interactions of most of the discrete variables and 
many of the continuous variables.  The interactions included interactions of components of X and Z with each other, 
Year×X, Year×Z, Age×X(except for age), Age×Z, Census region×X, Census region×Z.  We examined how the 
fraction of out of unit interval predictions changed for our key estimates and how the coefficients on the safety net 
variables changed as we made the specification progressively less parametric.  These explorations did not suggest 
that the simpler linear probability model estimates were badly biased.   
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uncompensated care is on average much lower, at nearly three dollars per capita, though it is 
above $30 dollars per capita in at least one MSA (Raleigh-Durham-Chapel Hill, NC).  Sources of 
support for hospitals and clinics include state and local tax appropriations for hospitals, which on 
average is $22 per capita.  Federal grant support for FQHCs is nearly $2.80 per capita, while 
state/local and private/other are smaller, averaging $0.92 and $0.31 per capita, respectively.  
State DSH spending is nearly $70 per capita and exceeded $400 per capita in one state 
(Louisiana in 1992).  State UC pool spending is $10 per capita, but as mentioned earlier is non-
zero in only five states.   
Table 2 reports how the means of our key variables change over time.  For convenience 
and to minimize sample composition changes over time in the MSA-level data, we display state-
level means of the policy variables over time; MSA level means are generally quite comparable. 
The fraction of children without any health insurance coverage rises over time before falling at 
the end of the period.  The fraction of children with private coverage has a less pronounced fall 
and more pronounced rise at the end.  Some of the drop in uninsurance reported at the end of the 
period is likely due to the addition of an uninsurance verification question (see Nelson and Mills, 
2001).  Because we include year indicators in all of the regressions the effect of this 
questionnaire change should be minimal and should not influence parameters of interest.  Over 
the period, Medicaid eligibility rises sharply from 27 percent of children ages 14 or under to 
nearly 50 percent.  The fraction of unmarried, childless adults without health insurance remains 
relatively constant in the mid-to-high 20 percent range.  Similarly, private health insurance for 
the adults dips during the 1990s but is virtually unchanged in 2000 relative to 1990 at 65 percent.   
Hospital UC increases slightly in the early 1990s, but falls on average in the late 1990s.  
By contrast, FQHC UC increases throughout the 1990s by a total of roughly 50 percent.  Our  
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simulated eligibility variables match trends in estimated eligibility for the sample of children.  
Both Medicaid managed care penetration and private HMO penetration increase sharply over the 
1990s.  Table 3 reports the mean and standard deviation for individual and family characteristics 
for our two samples.  About one quarter of the sample of children is in single-mother families.  
Nearly ninety percent of the children live in families with at least one employed adult, and a bare 
majority have two employed adults in the family.  Over 60 percent of children are in families 
with at least one family member working in a large firm, which is defined as 100 or more 
employees.  Among the unmarried, childless adult sample, slightly over 60 percent work full-
time with an additional 20 percent working part-time.   
 
B.  Estimating the Impact of Uncompensated Care 
Table 4 reports our first set of regressions that show the determinants of uninsurance, any 
private coverage, and public coverage for children using the MSA-level data.  Because we have 
strong beliefs about our Medicaid eligibility variable being endogenous (as it is a function of 
income and family status), we instrument for Medicaid eligibility for the child regressions.  
When we do not include MSA fixed effects in the specification, our simulated eligibility measure 
is national-level simulated eligibility.  MSA-level simulated eligibility is a function of the state 
family composition and earnings distribution and thus is likely correlated with the error term 
unless MSA fixed effects are included.  Medicaid eligibility has the expected impact on 
insurance coverage.   A ten percentage point increase in Medicaid eligibility is estimated to 
increase public coverage by about one percentage point, similar to the magnitude found in Ham 
and Shore-Sheppard (2005) and Lo Sasso and Buchmueller (2004). 
In the estimates without fixed effects the main source of identifying variation for the  
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uncompensated care variables is differences across MSAs in their usual level of uncompensated 
care.  The estimates without fixed effects provide an important baseline.  While we control for a 
number of important MSA and state level factors in our regression models, there are likely to be 
numerous unobserved factors, some of them the result of long-standing policies and industry 
make-up, that explain both coverage rates and UC levels.  To the extent that these unobservables 
are positively correlated with both high UC and low coverage, the estimated impact of UC on 
coverage is likely to be too high.  By including state/MSA fixed effects and examining the effect 
on the key safety net coefficients we can gauge the extent to which unmeasured area 
characteristics are confounding estimates.  The results will also serve to highlight the potential 
biases in the previous cross-sectional research on the subject or other research that did not 
include fixed effects.   
The estimates of the effect of hospital and center UC in Table 4 suggest crowd-out of 
both public and private coverage and an overall increase in uninsurance for children associated 
with hospital UC, but less consistent results for center UC.  Focusing on the estimates in the first 
three columns, a fifty percent (approximately one standard deviation) increase in hospital UC is 
predicted to increase uninsurance by between .5 and 2 percentage points.  We focus on the effect 
of a fifty percent increase in uncompensated care to provide an easily interpretable scaling of the 
coefficients.  The estimated effect of hospital UC diminishes as more geographically specific 
fixed effects are added to the specification.  The largest crowd-out effect in the private coverage 
estimates of column four suggests that a fifty percent increase in hospital uncompensated care 
would reduce private coverage by just over 1.5 percentage points, though with MSA fixed effects 
included the estimate falls to roughly one-quarter percentage point and is not statistically 
significant.  Interestingly, the impact of hospital UC on public coverage is negative and  
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significant for children, suggesting that a fifty percent increase in UC is estimated to decrease 
public coverage of children by roughly half a percentage point.   
The estimated effects associated with a fifty percent increase in health center provided 
uncompensated care are much smaller.  A fifty percent increase in center uncompensated care is 
predicted to lead to a small increase in the likelihood of no insurance coverage.  The 95 percent 
confidence interval for the effect of center uncompensated care in the estimates without fixed 
effects rules out a crowd-out effect of even two tenths of a percentage point.  The upper end of 
the confidence interval for the estimates with MSA fixed effects is only slightly higher.  The 
private coverage regression without fixed effects suggests that center UC may have a negative 
impact on private coverage.  A fifty percent increase in center UC is predicted to decrease 
private coverage by nearly 3 tenths of a percentage point.  With MSA fixed effects, the estimate 
is small and of the opposite sign.  None of the coefficient estimates for family and demographic 
variables contain surprising results.   
  In Table 5 we present comparable regression estimates for the adult sample.  Because 
public enrollment is quite rare for unmarried, childless adults between 18 and 64 years of age, we 
do not examine public coverage as an outcome variable.  For obvious reasons we do not include 
Medicaid eligibility in the adult regressions.  Hospital UC effects have a generally similar 
magnitude for adults relative to children and they exhibit the same general pattern: a fifty percent 
increase in hospital UC is predicted to increase uninsurance by .5 to 1.5 percentage points.  In the 
case of the estimate with MSA fixed effects, a 95 percent confidence interval does not rule out a 
decrease in uninsurance or no effect.  For private coverage, hospital UC has similarly sized 
effects on coverage, but in the opposite direction.  As with the child regressions, center UC 
effects are less consistently statistically significant.  The effect sizes for adults are comparable to  
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those for children: a fifty percent increase in center UC is predicted to increase uninsurance by 1 
to 2 tenths of a percentage point and decrease private coverage by less than 1 tenth of a 
percentage point.   
  Table 6 displays summary results for child and adult regressions conducted using 
measures of UC that are aggregated to the state level.  As mentioned earlier, the state-level 
measures of the safety net are less directly related to individual decision-making regarding health 
insurance coverage, thus making them cruder measures.  However, aggregating to the state-level 
reduces the effect of measurement error in individual hospital and health center reporting on a 
year-by-year basis.  We observe results that are qualitatively similar to our MSA-level findings.  
Some notable differences include the finding that hospital UC effects on children’s public health 
insurance coverage are much larger than those observed with the MSA-level UC measures.  In 
addition, health center UC has a more robust impact on adult health insurance coverage.   
   
C.  Instrumenting for Uncompensated Care 
The results presented thus far have assumed that UC is exogenous with respect to health 
insurance coverage.  The exogeneity assumption would be invalid if 1) there was some degree of 
“reverse causality” between the UC measures and insurance coverage or 2) if unobserved 
characteristics affect both insurance coverage and UC levels.  While it is unlikely to be the case 
that individuals can meaningfully affect the level of UC in a given MSA or state, we are 
concerned about the possibility that unmeasured factors might be correlated with both insurance 
coverage and UC.  We expect that to some extent safety net care will be mechanically greater 
where fewer people are covered by insurance and thus fewer people have their care paid for by 
insurance.  We also think that government entities supporting the safety net would feel that there  
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is greater need when there are more uncovered children.  However, there are uncovered children 
in all MSAs, so it is not clear how powerful the latter effect will be.  Additionally, it should be 
noted that in general the inclusion of MSA or state fixed effects is likely to control for many 
potential confounders.  Nevertheless, because of the first mechanical relationship we expect that 
safety net care will be greater in areas with lower child coverage, all else equal.  Thus, we expect 
that the estimates taking uncompensated care to be exogenous overstate the effect of safety net 
care in lowering overall insurance as well as lowering private insurance.  We think it is 
reasonable to take the estimates provided in the previous section as an upper bound on the 
magnitude of potential adverse effects of the provision of safety net care on coverage. 
For hospital UC, we use as instruments measures of financial support for safety net 
hospitals. The first variable is Medicaid Disproportionate Share dollars per capita for the state in 
which the hospital is located.  The DSH program supported hospitals and clinics providing a 
disproportionate share of Medicaid and uncompensated care.  The nature and history of the DSH 
program was described in more detail in Section 4.  In addition, we use state and local tax 
appropriations.  From the AHA Annual Survey we obtained annual tax appropriations received 
by hospitals within each MSA and state for the years 1990-2000.  This measure reflects payment 
received by hospitals from state and local governments.  In the year 2000 among short-term 
general non-federal hospitals, 59% of all public hospitals reported some tax appropriations, while 
roughly 22% of non-profit hospitals and 41% of for-profit hospitals received some tax 
appropriations.  In 2000 hospitals reported a total of $2.8 billion in tax appropriations, of which 
over 90% was distributed to public hospitals. Public hospitals received in aggregate 
approximately $2.5 billion in tax appropriations, for an average of just over $14 million per 
hospital for the 178 public hospitals that reported some tax appropriations. By contrast, for-profit  
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hospitals received a total of $62 million in tax appropriations for an average of just over 
$320,000 per hospital for the 193 for-profit hospitals that reported some tax appropriations. Not-
for-profit hospitals reported a total of $192 million in tax appropriations, for an average of 
$500,000 per hospital for the 385 not-for-profit hospitals that reported some tax appropriations. 
As with hospital uncompensated care, we are concerned about the potential endogeneity 
of center uncompensated care.  If fewer people are covered in an area, then a higher fraction of 
services provided by centers might go unpaid, and thus be classified as uncompensated care.  
Thus, we also consider variables that could be used as instruments for center safety net care.  Our 
two instruments are: 1) federal grants provided to health centers, and 2) state, local and private 
grant support for centers.  Both variables are obtained from the UDS and BCRR data. 
We also construct a number of political economy measures intended for use as 
instruments in our regression models.  These variables include the percentage of the MSA 
population voting Democratic in the presidential election (with linear time trends between 
presidential election years) and indicator variables for Democratic control of the governorship 
and the upper and lower houses of the state legislature.  Finally, we include a measure of the 
state budget surplus per capita to control for the potential flexibility that states might have 
regarding funding safety net care. 
Table 7 displays means over time of the instrumental variables.  Hospital tax 
appropriations fall by nearly 50 percent over the period.  There is a sharp rise in DSH spending 
apparent in the early 1990s followed by a gradual decline, while UC pool expenditures fall 
throughout the period.  Federal grant support for FQHCs generally falls over the period, while 
state and local support for health centers rise more steadily.  With the economic expansion of the 
second half of the 1990s, state budget surpluses increase and unemployment falls.  The fraction  
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of the state population voting for Democratic presidential candidates increases somewhat over 
the period, but the overall fraction of the population living in states with Democratic state 
legislatures and governors falls.   
Appendix Table C reports the first stage regressions for the child sample that show the 
determinants of the two types of uncompensated care and Medicaid eligibility.  The UC first 
stage regressions are very similar for adults and children and are quite similar when measured at 
the state- or MSA-level, hence we only discuss the results presented in Appendix Table C.  
[Additional tables for the first stage regressions are available upon request of the authors.]  
Several results are worth highlighting.  Medicaid eligibility has a negative and statistically 
significant effect on hospital UC (though not FQHC UC) suggesting that when Medicaid 
eligibility is higher it leads to less hospital uncompensated care.  As suggested earlier, this result 
might be expected because when Medicaid eligibility is higher it is more likely a low-income 
patient will have their bills paid through Medicaid rather than have them end up as 
uncompensated care.  The magnitude of the estimated effect is moderately sized, as a ten 
percentage point increase in eligibility is estimated to decrease hospital uncompensated care by 
roughly three percent.  Tax appropriations are estimated to have a strong effect on hospital 
uncompensated care.  For every dollar provided by states and localities, uncompensated care 
rises 31 cents.
15  Surprisingly, state-level DSH spending has no effect on hospital UC.  This 
could be a result of measurement error associated with DSH dollars being measured at the state-
level.  Alternatively, prior work has suggested that a significant portion of total DSH dollars 
                                                 
15 This result raises the question of where the other 69 cents goes, which is an interesting issue that we 
leave for future research.  
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might have been appropriated by the state and used for general revenues (Baicker and Staiger 
2004, GAO 1994, Ku and Coughlin 1995).   
Grant support for health centers is not associated with significantly more uncompensated 
care by hospitals, providing some suggestive evidence for the validity of it as an instrument.  If 
grant support were capturing the unmeasured need for the safety net because coverage is low, we 
would expect health center grant support to predict hospital UC.  Similarly, hospital tax 
appropriations do not contribute to higher center UC (column 6).  Again, this evidence suggests 
that hospital tax appropriations do not capture the unmeasured need for the safety net, suggesting 
that it may be a valid instrument.  Democratic control of the lower house of the state legislature 
is associated with higher hospital UC provision.   
Turning to the FQHC UC regressions, a significant determinant of center uncompensated 
care is federal grant support, the coefficient of which indicates that 55 cents of every dollar of 
federal grant support is spent on UC.  This result corresponds to some earlier suggestions that 
FQHCs were diverting federal grant dollars to pay for under paid Medicaid services (Hoag, et al. 
2000).  State and local support has the expected sign, but is not significantly different from zero.  
It is not clear how state and local grant support is spent, but our results do not suggest that these 
monies are used to subsidize the provision of UC to the uninsured.  State DSH programs do not 
directly support health centers, thus the marginally statistically significant result is surprising.  
Also significant is Democratic control of the upper house of the state legislature.   
One other result, or non-result, is worth mentioning.  The unemployment rate and per 
capita income are not determinants of hospital and center safety net provision (with MSA fixed 
effects) even though they are associated with private coverage.  This result suggests that need  
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(the private coverage rate) may not be the main determinant of safety net provision, but instead it 
is other factors such as local political leadership or local tastes for support for the safety net.   
The determinants of Medicaid eligibility are mostly not surprising.  The coefficients on 
simulated eligibility are close to one and are very precisely measured.  Higher unemployment 
increases eligibility, which is expected given that the simulated eligibility calculation uses a 
distribution of income and other family characteristics that does not vary over time.  Higher UC 
pool expenditures is associated with lower Medicaid eligibility, which could suggest that states 
with UC pools could be applying more resources to supporting the pool than to expanding 
eligibility, all else constant.  Higher Medicaid managed care penetration is associated with higher 
Medicaid eligibility, which could suggest that states might have been willing to “trade” greater 
use of manage care for greater eligibility.  Democratic control of the upper house of the state 
legislature is associated with higher Medicaid eligibility.  The family structure and education 
variables have the expected signs and have strong and precisely estimated effects [not displayed].   
Our estimates that take uncompensated care to endogenous are reported in Table 8, for 
children and adults using MSA-level measures of UC.  As before, we consider estimates that rely 
mostly on the differences in the safety net across states for their identifying variation.  We then 
estimate our models with state fixed effects.  Finally we include MSA fixed effects.  The 
estimates that do not include fixed effects use national-level simulated eligibility as an 
instrument for Medicaid eligibility.  Because the MSA earnings distribution is incorporated in 
MSA-level simulated eligibility measure, we believe that it is important to control for MSA fixed 
effects with this instrument.  We contrast results with and without fixed effects (but with controls 
for unemployment, per capita income, and managed care penetration).  The estimates without 
fixed effects suggest that a fifty percent increase in hospital uncompensated care would increase  
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uninsurance for children by 2.5 percentage points, decrease private coverage by 2 percentage, 
and decrease public coverage by 6 tenths of a percentage point.  For health center UC the 
uninsurance regression suggests no crowd-out, but the private coverage regression suggests that 
a fifty percent increase in center UC is associated with a decrease in private coverage of between 
one and two tenths of a percentage point.  The public coverage regression shows a somewhat 
surprising positive effect of center UC on public coverage.  
When we control for state fixed effects the identifying variation in the estimation comes 
from changes in uncompensated care within states over time.  In this case, the uninsurance effect 
is roughly halved to an increase of 1.2 percentage point associated with a 50% rise in hospital 
UC; for private coverage the effect is a drop of 9 tenths of a percentage point; while for public 
coverage the effect is a drop of 6 tenths of a percentage point.  For health center UC the 
uninsurance regression suggests an increase in uninsurance of 2 tenths of a percentage point and 
a decrease in private coverage of nearly 4 tenths of a percentage point with a fifty percent rise in 
center UC.  The public coverage regression again shows a surprising positive effect of center UC 
on public coverage.   
Controlling for MSA fixed effects restricts the identifying variation to changes in UC 
within MSAs over time.  Using 2SLS and including MSA fixed effects leads the standard errors 
on the hospital uncompensated care measures to rise substantially.  While the hospital 
uncompensated care coefficient in the children’s uninsurance regression now has a negative sign 
suggesting no crowd-out, the standard error on the coefficient is nearly four times larger than it 
was with state fixed effects.  Similarly in the private coverage regression the hospital UC 
coefficient is large and positive, and in this case statistically significant.  A fifty percent increase 
in center UC is associated with an increase in uninsurance of 3 tenths of a percentage point and a  
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(statistically insignificant) drop in private coverage of 2 tenths of a percentage point.  The public 
coverage regression now suggests higher center UC is associated with a drop in public coverage, 
but the coefficient is not significant.   
The adult regressions treating UC as endogenous are displayed in the bottom panel of 
Table 8.  The hospital and center UC effects are qualitatively similar to those observed for 
children, though they are generally smaller in magnitude.   
Table 9 displays the complementary analyses using state-level measures of UC.  For 
children the results are qualitatively similar to the results observed using MSA-level measures.  
In the bottom panel we see that the center UC coefficients in the fixed effects regressions suggest 
that a fifty percent increase in center UC is associated with a nearly 1.3 percentage point increase 
in uninsurance among single, childless adults with a comparable decrease in private coverage.  
The effect size is two to three times higher than previous estimates observed, but nonetheless 
implies an elasticity of private coverage relative to center UC of roughly –0.1, which is 
comparatively small.  
Table 10 displays estimates of the main specifications displayed in Tables 8 and 9 for 
childless adults using residual added probit regressions.  Under the assumption that the first stage 
regressions for the endogenous variables have normally distributed errors, Rivers and Vuong 
(1988) show that including the first stage residuals as additional probit regressors gives 
consistent estimates.  There are two things about these results worth noting.  First, the computed 
marginal effects for the probit results rarely deviate from the linear probability model results 
seen earlier by more than 15% and frequently are considerably closer.  The specifications where 
there are larger differences are generally those with small coefficients and large standard errors 
to begin with.  The results lend support to the use of linear probability models for this research.   
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A second point is that the residual added terms in the regression are frequently significant in the 
specifications that do not include fixed effects, but, with the exception of the state-level 
uninsurance regression, when fixed effects are included the residual added terms are no longer 
significant.  However, the insignificance of the hospital UC first stage residuals is in large part 
due to substantial standard errors rather than small coefficients.  Because the residual added 
terms can be used as a test of endogeneity the results suggest that the inclusion of fixed effects is 
successful in removing the endogenous component of safety net care from the regression, at least 
for center UC.    
 
7.  Discussion and Conclusions 
There is an extensive literature on the extent to which public health insurance coverage 
through Medicaid induces less private health insurance coverage.  However, little is known about 
the effect of other components of the health care safety net in crowding out private coverage.  
We examine the effect of Medicaid and uncompensated care provided by clinics and hospitals on 
insurance coverage.  We construct a long panel of state- and MSA-level data on hospital 
uncompensated care and free and reduced price care offered by Federally Qualified Health 
Centers.  We match this information to individual level data on coverage from the Current 
Population Survey.  Our results provide mixed evidence on the extent of crowd-out.  Hospital 
UC does not appear to have crowded-out health insurance coverage for children, but the degree 
of precision in the estimates is lacking in our best controlled regression specification.  However, 
FQHC UC does appear to crowd-out private coverage for single, childless adults and, in some 
specifications, for children.  
Less crowd-out for hospital uncompensated care may be plausible given that most  
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hospital uncompensated care pays for big ticket items rather than more routine care that 
individuals may think of when making coverage decisions.  Most of the arguments about the 
exogeneity of our uncompensated care measures suggest that our estimates should overstate the 
extent of crowd-out.  Similarly, the likely potential endogeneity concerns about our instruments 
would also suggest that we should overstate the extent of crowd-out.  That we do not find strong 
evidence of crowd-out suggests that the effects may be small if present.  Further study of the 
determinants of uncompensated care provision is called for, and would shed light on the validity 
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Summary of the MSA Selection Criteria: 
We start with the 281 MSAs ever identified in the CPS between 1990 and 2000.  We lose 27 of 
these because the MSAs are defined by a city, a parish or part of a county and thus cannot be 
identified solely through the use of county codes. We dropped an additional 29 because they are 
reported in the CPS in such a way (for nondisclosure reasons) that the reported geographic unit 
differs from the county based true MSA definition by more than ten percent of the population 
(not identified, not in sample).  Of these MSAs, 13 are only identified for either 1990-1994 or 
1995-2000, but not both.  In addition, for 17 of these MSAs the definition changes are large 
enough to affect more than ten percent of the population.  In this case, we include separate MSA 
dummy variables for the two periods, i.e. we treat them as different MSAs in the two periods.  In 
summary, after exclusions, we are left with 139 stable MSAs over the entire period and an 
additional 63 MSAs available for the period 1990-1994 and an additional 53 available for the 
period 1995-2000.  
 
Family characteristic variables used in simulated eligibility calculations: 
The family characteristics that we take from the sample used to simulate eligibility are number of 
parents in family, number of children under 18, family income minus welfare income (this is 
equal to earned plus unearned income minus public assistance income), family earnings, and an 
indicator for whether either spouse in a two parent family worked more than 1200 hours in 
previous year (which is used to calculate eligibility for AFDC-UP). 
 
Sources of other explanatory variables: 
We obtain several state level variables by aggregating county level data from the Area Resource 
File (ARF). We use the ARF to obtain the population under 65, the unemployment rate, and per 
capita income.   
 
Private and Medicaid HMO Penetration: 
The private HMO penetration rate by county for the years 1990-2000 is provided by InterStudy 
Publications.  Interstudy conducts primary survey research, surveying all full-service HMOs 
twice each year. The survey instrument, known as the InterStudy National HMO Census, collects 
data on key personnel, enrollment by product type, plan name and address, provider contract 
information, and many other topics.  The methodology to derive county-level estimates of HMO 
enrollment is described in detail in Wholey et al. (1995).  We aggregate the county information 
to the state level. 
 
The state Medicaid managed care rate is derived using administrative data from the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS).  Using enrollment data in managed care plans and total 
Medicaid enrollment, we can calculate average Medicaid managed care penetration from 1990 to 
2000.  
 
State-Specific Medical Price CPI 
We used the regional medical CPI collected by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, but benchmarked 
it to allow for state differences with the Geographic Practice Cost Index (GPCI).  
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics, Insurance Coverage and Policy Variables 1990-2000, MSA-
Level Data Set 






Insurance Variables       
No health insurance coverage-Children  0.143     
Private health insurance coverage-Children  0.652     
Public health insurance coverage-Children  0.248     
Medicaid eligibility-Children  0.359     
No health insurance coverage-Adults  0.277     
Private health insurance coverage-Adults  0.637     
Simulated Medicaid eligibility (MSA)-Children  0.355  0.143  0.027 – 1  
Simulated Medicaid eligibility (National)-Children  0.343  0.117  0.086 – 0.99 
       
Safety Net and Policy Variables†       
Real MSA level hospital UC per capita  90.526  46.650  13.56 – 811.23 
Real MSA level FQHC UC per capita   2.155  3.352  0 – 32.35 
Real MSA level hospital tax appropriations per 
capita  22.122  34.604  0 – 1013.5 
Real MSA level FQHC federal revenue per capita  2.785  3.223  0 – 67.35 
Real MSA level FQHC state and local revenue per 




0 – 24.72 
Real MSA level FQHC other revenue per capita  0.312  0596  0 – 19.96 
Real DSH spending per capita  66.266  58.955  0 – 439.48 
State Medicaid managed care penetration  0.287  0.268  0 – 1  
Real state budget surplus per capita ($1000)  379.880  265.922  –199.58 – 2618.64 
Real UC pool expense per capita  9.794  25.285  0 – 185.09 
Fraction voting Democratic in MSA  0.557  0.103  0.143 – 0.774 
Democratic control of upper house legislature  0.400     
Democratic control of lower house legislature  0.627     
Democratic governor  0.364     
Unemployment rate  5.690  2.220  1.367 – 19.798 
Real per capita income ($1000)  24.491  4.475  10.04 – 41.09 
Private HMO penetration rate  0.268  0.139  0 – 0.884 
Sample size is 182,152 for the children and 151,779 for the adults. Data for children aged 14 or less and unmarried, childless 
adults aged 18-64 from 1991-2001 CPS March Annual Demographic File representing insurance coverage years 1990-2000.  All 
per capita variables constructed using MSA population under 65 years of age. 
† Descriptive statistics displayed for adult sample; child sample means of policy variables are similar. 
 
  
  41 
 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Policy and Coverage Variables Over Time, State-Level 
Data Set 
Variable†  1990  1992  1994  1996  1998  2000 
No health insurance coverage-child  0.132  0.127  0.139  0.147  0.159  0.123 
Private health insurance coverage-
child  0.711  0.686  0.651  0.652  0.665  0.682 
Public health insurance coverage-
child  0.154  0.172  0.238  0.229  0.203  0.222 
Medicaid eligibility-child  0.268  0.322  0.345  0.357  0.400  0.488 
No health insurance coverage-adult  0.261  0.276  0.270  0.272  0.280  0.254 
Private health insurance coverage-
adult  0.655  0.631  0.637  0.627  0.630  0.654 
Real state level hospital UC per 
capita  87.416  90.275  92.520  89.605  87.247  85.625 
Real state level FQHC UC per capita  2.042  1.959  2.078  2.333  2.639  2.974 
Simulated Medicaid eligibility 
(state)  0.276  0.326  0.345  0.357  0.425  0.474 
Simulated Medicaid eligibility 
(National)  0.277  0.322  0.340  0.351  0.429  0.475 
Medicaid managed care penetration  0.067  0.132  0.202  0.377  0.501  0.538 
Private HMO penetration rate  0.175  0.184  0.224  0.294  0.309  0.307 
Unemployment rate  5.609  7.512  6.110  5.479  4.641  4.053 
Real per capita income ($1000)  32.353  29.699  28.590  28.465  29.649  30.429 
Sample sizes are 363,622 for children, 293,350 for adults.  Data are from 1991-2001 CPS March Annual Demographic File 
representing insurance coverage years 1990-2000.  All dollar values in real terms.  All per capita variables constructed using state 
population under 65 years of age. 
† Except where indicated, descriptive statistics displayed for adult sample; child sample means of policy variables are similar. 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics, Socio-Demographic Characteristics, Child and Childless, 
Unmarried Adult Samples, 1990-2000, MSA-Level Data Set 
Variable  Child Sample  Adult Sample 
Female  0.491  0.448 
     
Non-white  0.202  0.365 
     
Age  6.873  32.800 
  (4.267)  (13.034) 
Mother only present  0.241  --- 
     
Father only present  0.038  --- 
     
One worker in household  0.386  --- 
     
Two workers in household  0.505  --- 
     
Full-time worker  ---  0.629 
     
Part-time worker  ---  0.183 
     
At least one person in household works for large (100+ employees) firm  0.609  0.470 
     
High school graduate  ---  0.291 
     
Some college  ---  0.316 
     
College graduate  ---  0.210 
     
Mother’s education: high school graduate  0.329  --- 
     
Mother’s education: some college  0.255  --- 
     
Mother’s education: college graduate  0.191  --- 
     
Father’s education: high school graduate  0.234  --- 
     
Father’s education: some college  0.182  --- 
     
Father’s education: college graduate   0.215  --- 
     
Sample size  182,152  151,779 
Data for children aged 14 or less and unmarried, childless adults aged 18-64 from 1991-2001 CPS March Annual Demographic 
File representing insurance coverage years 1990-2000.  Standard deviations in parentheses.  
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Table 4: Child Sample, Uninsurance, private coverage, and public coverage MSA-Level 2SLS regressions  
  Uninsurance  Private Coverage  Public Coverage 
  No FE  State FE  MSA FE  No FE  State FE  MSA FE  No FE  State FE  MSA FE 
Medicaid eligible  –0.093***  –0.026  –0.060***  0.007  0.013  –0.009  0.145***  0.037  0.093*** 
    (0.022)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.023)  (0.024)  (0.021)  (0.026)  (0.024)  (0.022) 
Hospital UC/pop   0.439***  0.271***  0.103  –0.361***  –0.247***  –0.064  –0.125***  –0.114**  –0.110 
  ($1000)  (0.043)  (0.049)  (0.079)  (0.047)  (0.053)  (0.075)  (0.042)  (0.050)  (0.082) 
FQHC UC/pop  0.0008*  0.0015***  0.0008  –0.0024***  –0.0026***  0.0007  0.0016***  0.0011  –0.0011 
  (0.0005)  (0.0006)  (0.0009)  (0.0005)  (0.0006)  (0.0009)  (0.0006)  (0.0007)  (0.0010) 
MMC penetration   –0.019*  –0.020*  –0.014  0.010  0.009  0.010  0.011  0.028**  0.017 
  Rate  (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.011)  (0.014)  (0.014) 
HMO penetration rate  0.025  –0.030**  –0.019  –0.048***  0.013  –0.015  –0.006  –0.017  0.022 
  (0.018)  (0.013)  (0.019)  (0.016)  (0.017)  (0.024)  (0.016)  (0.020)  (0.025) 
Per capita  income   –0.003***  0.000  0.002  0.006***  0.003***  0.002  –0.005***  –0.006***  –0.004** 
  ($1000s)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002) 
Unemployment rate   0.001  –0.001  0.000  –0.008***  –0.006***  –0.007**  0.004***  0.005***  0.002 
  (%)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002) 
Female child  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  –0.004**  –0.004**  –0.004** 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Nonwhite race  0.027***  0.029***  0.031***  –0.093***  –0.098***  –0.095***  0.093***  0.098***  0.092*** 
  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.006) 
Dad only present  –0.001  0.013  0.014  0.099***  0.096***  0.090***  –0.122***  –0.137***  –0.132*** 
  (0.010)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009) 
Mom only present  –0.104***  –0.101***  –0.095***  –0.021***  –0.027***  –0.026***  0.096***  0.101***  0.095*** 
  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
Dad high school   –0.131***  –0.111***  –0.114***  0.176***  0.170***  0.165***  –0.023***  –0.042***  –0.034*** 
  Graduate  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
Dad some college   –0.171***  –0.151***  –0.155***  0.223***  0.220***  0.214***  –0.025***  –0.049***  –0.039*** 
  Education  (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008) 
Dad college   –0.191***  –0.168***  –0.174***  0.260***  0.256***  0.249***  –0.053***  –0.080***  –0.067*** 
  Education  (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.008) 
(continues)  
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Table 4: Child Sample, Uninsurance, private coverage, and public coverage MSA-Level 2SLS regressions (continued) 
  Uninsurance  Private Coverage  Public Coverage 
  No FE  State FE  MSA FE  No FE  State FE  MSA FE  No FE  State FE  MSA FE 
Mom high school   –0.083***  –0.066***  –0.067***  0.176***  0.169***  0.164***  –0.085***  –0.101***  –0.094*** 
  Graduate  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
Mom some college   –0.112***  –0.093***  –0.096***  0.234***  0.230***  0.224***  –0.115***  –0.137***  –0.128*** 
  Education  (0.008)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
Mom college   –0.133***  –0.108***  –0.113***  0.280***  0.273***  0.268***  –0.155***  –0.182***  –0.170*** 
  Education  (0.009)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.008) 
1 working parent  0.113***  0.125***  0.116***  0.201***  0.206***  0.198***  –0.305***  –0.333***  –0.314*** 
  (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.009)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.011) 
2 working parents  0.099***  0.124***  0.109***  0.252***  0.258***  0.245***  –0.345***  –0.391***  –0.363*** 
  (0.015)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.012)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.014) 
Parent(s) work for   –0.126***  –0.118***  –0.120***  0.178***  0.177***  0.174***  –0.022***  –0.034***  –0.029*** 
  large firm (100+)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.004) 
Regressions also include age dummies, year dummies, and state fixed effects (where indicated).  Regressions treat Medicaid eligibility as endogenous instrumenting with national-
level simulated eligibility for the no state-FE regressions and.  N=363,622; coverage years 1990-2000 for children 14 and under.  Regressions control for state-year clustering. 
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Table 5: Single Childless Adult Sample, Uninsurance and private coverage, MSA-Level 
OLS regressions 
  Uninsurance  Private Insurance  
  No FE  State FE  MSA FE  No FE  State FE  MSA FE 
Hospital UC/pop  0.343***  0.158***  0.096  –0.302***  –0.145***  –0.068 
 ($1000s)  (0.046)  (0.045)  (0.065)  (0.043)  (0.042)  (0.063) 
FQHC UC/pop  0.0007  0.0012**  0.0016**  –0.0008*  –0.0006  –0.0006 
  (0.0005)  (0.0005)  (0.0007)  (0.0005)  (0.0005)  (0.0006) 
MMC penetration Rate  –0.028***  –0.032***  –0.040***  0.016  0.022**  0.028*** 
  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.010) 
HMO penetration rate  0.043**  –0.031**  0.003  –0.042***  0.023  –0.036* 
  (0.017)  (0.014)  (0.019)  (0.015)  (0.016)  (0.021) 
Per capita  income   0.000***  0.000  0.000  0.000***  0.000  0.000 
  ($1000s)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Unemployment rate   0.008***  0.006***  0.000  –0.008***  –0.007***  –0.003** 
  (%)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002) 
Nonwhite race  0.116***  0.109***  0.106***  –0.140***  –0.136***  –0.134*** 
  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
High school graduate  –0.077***  –0.073***  –0.072***  0.137***  0.134***  0.133*** 
    (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
Some college education  –0.162***  –0.162***  –0.162***  0.255***  0.255***  0.255*** 
    (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
College education  –0.222***  –0.222***  –0.222***  0.335***  0.333***  0.333*** 
    (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
Female   –0.041***  –0.041***  –0.041***  0.033***  0.032***  0.032*** 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Works full-time  0.027***  0.023***  0.023***  0.251***  0.252***  0.252*** 
  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
Works part-time  0.105***  0.102***  0.102***  0.102***  0.103***  0.102*** 
  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
Works for large firm   –0.165***  –0.163***  –0.162***  0.163***  0.162***  0.162*** 
  (100+)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Regressions also include age dummies, year dummies, and state or MSA fixed effects (where indicated).  N=293,350; coverage 
years 1990-2000 for unmarried, childless adults aged 18-64.  Regressions control for state-year clustering. Huber-White standard 
errors in parentheses. *** indicates p<0.01, ** indicates 0.05<p<0.01, * indicates 0.10<p<0.05. 
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Table 6: Child and Adult Samples, Uninsurance, private coverage, and public coverage 
State-Level 2SLS and OLS regressions  
  Uninsurance  Private Coverage  Public Coverage 
  No FE  State FE  No FE  State FE  No FE  State FE 
Child Estimates             
Medicaid eligible  –0.090***  –0.048***  0.027*  0.021  0.083***  0.034** 
    (0.018)  (0.014)  (0.016)  (0.014)  (0.022)  (0.013) 
Hospital UC/pop   0.393***  0.243**  –0.229***  –0.005  –0.254***  –0.314*** 
  ($1000)  (0.060)  (0.098)  (0.065)  (0.094)  (0.048)  (0.095) 
FQHC UC/pop  0.0011  –0.0014  –0.0022***  –0.0007  0.0009  0.0025 
  (0.0007)  (0.0014)  (0.0008)  (0.0017)  (0.0009)  (0.0018) 
Adult Estimates             
Hospital UC/pop   0.119**  0.064  –0.019  0.017  ---  --- 
  ($1000)  (0.059)  (0.101)  (0.054)  (0.098)     
FQHC UC/pop  0.0030***  0.0033**  –0.0041***  –0.0036***  ---  --- 
  (0.0007)  (0.0014)  (0.0006)  (0.0013)     
Regressions also include demographic variables, area characteristics, age dummies, year dummies, and state and MSA fixed 
effects (where indicated).  Regressions treat Medicaid eligibility as endogenous for the child regressions instrumenting with 
national-level simulated eligibility for the no FE regressions and state-level simulated eligibility for the state-FE regressions.  
Coverage years 1990-2000.  N=182,152 for children 14 and under; N=151,779 for unmarried, childless adults aged 18-64.  
Regressions control for state-year clustering. Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. *** indicates p<0.01, ** indicates 
0.05<p<0.01, * indicates 0.10<p<0.05. 
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Table 7: Descriptive Statistics for Instrumental Variables Over Time, State-Level Data Set 
Variable†  1990  1992  1994  1996  1998  2000 
Real state level hospital tax 
appropriations per capita  23.159  17.832  19.370  17.720  15.126  12.310 
Real state DSH per capita  5.714  105.279  91.765  71.107  63.446  54.336 
Real UC pool expense per capita  17.115  14.411  10.327  7.806  7.267  6.415 
Real state level FQHC federal grants 
per capita  4.130  3.494  3.561  3.848  3.037  3.428 
Real state level FQHC state and 
local grants per capita  1.002  0.959  1.221  1.393  1.371  1.410 
Real state level FQHC other grants 
per capita  0.309  0.406  0.522  0.201  0.230  0.421 
Real state budget surplus per capita 
($1000)  374.564  258.555  392.710  577.076  827.966  809.790 
Fraction voting Democratic in state  0.447  0.433  0.466  0.496  0.489  0.484 
Democratic control of upper house 
legislature  0.651  0.523  0.462  0.440  0.413  0.415 
Democratic control of lower house 
legislature  0.830  0.768  0.448  0.438  0.586   0.565 
Democratic governor  0.552  0.519  0.523  0.282  0.266  0.325 
Sample size 293,350 (for adults).  All dollar values in real terms.  All per capita variables constructed using state population 
under 65 years of age. 
† Descriptive statistics displayed for adult sample; child sample means of policy variables are similar.  
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Table 8: Child and Adult Samples, Uninsurance, private coverage, and public coverage 2SLS regressions, MSA-Level Sample, 
Instrumenting for UC  
  Uninsurance  Private Coverage  Public Coverage 
  No FE  State FE  MSA FE  No FE  State FE  MSA FE  No FE  State FE  MSA FE 
Child Estimates                   
Medicaid eligible  –0.080***  –0.021  –0.072***  –0.008  0.005  0.005  0.149***  0.038  0.101*** 
    (0.024)  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.023)  (0.027)  (0.024)  (0.023) 
Hospital UC/pop   0.558***  0.258***  –0.468*  –0.444***  –0.208***  0.627**  –0.143**  –0.129*  0.173 
  ($1000)  (0.089)  (0.080)  (0.282)  (0.083)  (0.076)  (0.316)  (0.060)  (0.067)  (0.312) 
FQHC UC/pop  –0.0011  0.0019***  0.0029**  –0.0014**  –0.0037***  –0.0018  0.0027***  0.0017**  –0.0025 
  (0.0008)  (0.0006)  (0.0014)  (0.0007)  (0.0008)  (0.0017)  (0.0007)  (0.0008)  (0.0016) 
Adult Estimates                   
Hospital UC/pop   0.402***  0.157**  –0.265  –0.321***  –0.166**  0.188  ---  ---  --- 
  ($1000)  (0.084)  (0.072)  (0.249)  (0.070)  (0.065)  (0.250)       
FQHC UC/pop  –0.0012*  0.0013**  0.0016  0.0002  –0.0009  –0.0013  ---  ---  --- 
  (0.0007)  (0.0006)  (0.0012)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0012)       
Regressions also include demographic variables, area characteristics, age dummies, year dummies, and State and MSA fixed effects (where indicated).  Regressions treat Medicaid 
eligibility as endogenous instrumenting with national-level simulated eligibility for the no FE and state-FE regressions and MSA-level simulated eligibility for the MSA-FE 
regressions.  2SLS models instrument UC with real state hospital tax appropriations per capita, real state DSH dollars per capita, real federal grant dollars for FQHCs per capita, 
real state/local grant dollars for FQHCs per capita, real other grant dollars for FQHCs per capita, real state budget surplus per capita, fraction voting Democratic in state, 
Democratic party control indicators for governor and upper and lower houses of state legislature, and real UC pool dollars per capita.  Coverage years 1990-2000.  N=182,152 for 
children 14 and under; N=151,779 for unmarried, childless adults aged 18-64.  Regressions control for MSA-year clustering. Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. *** 
indicates p<0.01, ** indicates 0.05<p<0.01, * indicates 0.10<p<0.05. 
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Table 9: Child and Adult Samples, Uninsurance, private coverage, and public coverage 
2SLS regressions, State-Level Sample, Instrumenting for UC  
  Uninsurance  Private Coverage  Public Coverage 
  No FE  State FE  No FE  State FE  No FE  State FE 
Child Estimates             
Medicaid eligible  –0.076***  –0.056***  0.016  0.029*  0.084***  0.037** 
    (0.018)  (0.016)  (0.017)  (0.016)  (0.022)  (0.015) 
Hospital UC/pop   0.475***  –0.333  –0.343***  0.631  –0.178***  –0.189 
  ($1000)  (0.090)  (0.479)  (0.104)  (0.503)  (0.059)  (0.359) 
FQHC UC/pop  –0.0006  0.0038  0.0006  –0.0062  0.0007  0.0027 
  (0.0011)  (0.0038)  (0.0014)  (0.0041)  (0.0010)  (0.0039) 
Adult Estimates             
Hospital UC/pop   0.054  -0.290  0.012  –0.035  ---  --- 
  ($1000)  (0.074)  (0.325)  (0.065)  (0.226)     
FQHC UC/pop  0.0016  0.0091**  –0.0026**  –0.0065*  ---  --- 
  (0.0011)  (0.0044)  (0.0011)  (0.0036)     
Regressions also include demographic variables, area characteristics, age dummies, year dummies, and state fixed effects (where 
indicated).  Regressions treat Medicaid eligibility as endogenous instrumenting with national-level simulated eligibility for the no 
state-FE regressions and state-level simulated eligibility for the state-FE regressions.  2SLS models instrument UC with real state 
hospital tax appropriations per capita, real state DSH dollars per capita, real federal grant dollars for FQHCs per capita, real 
state/local grant dollars for FQHCs per capita, real other grant dollars for FQHCs per capita, real state budget surplus per capita, 
fraction voting Democratic in state, Democratic party control indicators for governor and upper and lower houses of state 
legislature, and real UC pool dollars per capita.  Coverage years 1990-2000.  N=363,622 for children 14 and under; N=293,350 
for unmarried, childless adults aged 18-64.  Regressions control for state-year clustering. Huber-White standard errors in 
parentheses. *** indicates p<0.01, ** indicates 0.05<p<0.01, * indicates 0.10<p<0.05. 
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Table 10: Adult Sample, Uninsurance and Private Coverage, Residual Added Probit 
Regressions Controlling for UC Endogeneity, MSA- and State-Level Samples 
  Uninsurance  Private Coverage 
  No FE  FE  No FE  FE 
MSA Level         
Hospital UC/pop   0.410***  –0.256  –0.370***  0.217 
  ($1000)  (0.041)  (0.210)  (0.041)  (0.224) 
FQHC UC/pop  –0.0015***  0.0015  0.0003  –0.0015 
  (0.0004)  (0.0013)  (0.0004)  (0.0013) 
1
st Stage Residual,  -0.120  1.211  -0.020  -0.897 
  Hospital UC  (0.181)  (0.765)  (0.179)  (0.793) 
1
st Stage Residual,  0.016***  0.001  -0.008***  0.003 
  FQHC UC  (0.002)  (0.005)  (0.002)  (0.003) 
State-Level Estimates         
Hospital UC/pop   0.060**  -0.300**  0.019  0.012 
  ($1000)  (0.026)  (0.152)  (0.026)  (0.156) 
FQHC UC/pop  0.0016***  0.0101***  –0.0029***  –0.0084*** 
  (0.0005)  (0.0021)  (0.0006)  (0.0023) 
1
st Stage Residual,  0.812***  1.355**  -0.462***  0.008 
  Hospital UC  (0.143)  (0.529)  (0.144)  (0.516) 
1
st StageResidual,  0.014***  -0.025***  -0.014***  0.013 
  FQHC UC  (0.003)  (0.008)  (0.003)  (0.009) 
Mean marginal effects displayed for probit coefficients of uncompensated care variables.  Regressions also include demographic 
variables, area characteristics, age dummies, year dummies, and MSA or state fixed effects (where indicated). Probit regressions 
include predicted residuals from first stage OLS models of UC controlling for above mentioned variables plus excluded 
instruments: real state hospital tax appropriations per capita, real state DSH dollars per capita, real federal grant dollars for 
FQHCs per capita, real state/local grant dollars for FQHCs per capita, real other grant dollars for FQHCs per capita, real state 
budget surplus per capita, fraction voting Democratic in state, Democratic party control indicators for governor and upper and 
lower houses of state legislature, and real UC pool dollars per capita.  Coverage years 1990-2000.  N=151,779 for MSA sample 
of unmarried, childless adults aged 18-64; N=293,350 for state sample of unmarried, childless adults aged 18-64.  Standard errors 
(in parentheses) bootstrapped from 500 repetitions. *** indicates p<0.01, ** indicates 0.05<p<0.01, * indicates 0.10<p<0.05. 
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Appendix Table A: Descriptive Statistics, Insurance Coverage and Policy Variables 1990-
2000, State-Level Data 






Endogenous Variables       
No insurance coverage-Children  0.139     
Private health insurance coverage-Children  0.673     
Public health insurance coverage-Children  0.203     
Medicaid eligibility-Children  0.359     
No insurance coverage-Adult  0.271     
Private health insurance coverage-Adult  0.637     
       
Real state level hospital UC per capita  89.563  44.399  25.93 – 464.99 
Real state level FQHC UC per capita   2.834  2.431  0 – 23.13 
       
Policy Variables†       
Real state level hospital tax appropriations per 




0 – 260.61 
Real state level FQHC federal grants per capita  4.446  2.601  0 – 16.34 
Real state level FQHC state and local grants per 




0 – 14.08 
Real state level FQHC other revenue per capita  0.473  0.480  0 – 5.80 
Real DSH spending per capita  68.240  69.783  0 – 593.19 
Real UC pool expense per capita  10.355  30.311  0 – 226.79 
Simulated Medicaid eligibility (State)  0.361  0.129  0.09 – 1.0 
Simulated Medicaid eligibility (National)  0.358  0.128  0.09 – 1.0 
State Medicaid managed care penetration  0.301  0.280  0 – 1  
Private HMO penetration rate  0.239  0.148  0 – 0.653 
Real state budget surplus per capita ($1000)  429.472  523.956  –801.94 – 7284.44 
Fraction voting Democratic in state  0.468  0.082  0.263 – 0.852 
Democratic control of upper house legislature  0.499     
Democratic control of lower house legislature  0.635     
Democratic governor  0.411     
Unemployment rate  5.696  1.617  2.2 – 11.4 
Real per capita income ($1000)  23.785  4.545  13.16 – 41.45 
Sample sizes are 363,622 for children, 293,350 for adults.  Data are from 1991-2001 CPS March Annual Demographic File 
representing insurance coverage years 1990-2000.  All per capita variables constructed using state population under 65 years of 
age. 
† Except for simulated eligibility, descriptive statistics displayed for adult sample; child sample means of policy variables are 
similar.  
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Appendix Table B: Descriptive Statistics, Socio-Demographic Characteristics, Child and 
Childless, Unmarried Adult Samples, 1990-2000, State-Level Data Set 
Variable  Child Sample  Adult Sample 
Female  0.491  0.442 
     
Non-white  0.185  0.308 
     
Age  6.672  33.147 
  (4.275)  (13.324) 
Mother only present  0.230  --- 
     
Father only present  0.041  --- 
     
One worker in household  0.370  --- 
     
Two workers in household  0.534  --- 
     
Full-time worker  ---  0.625 
     
Part-time worker  ---  0.190 
     
At least one person in household works for large (100+ employees) firm  0.612  0.460 
     
High school graduate  ---  0.305 
     
Some college  ---  0.311 
     
College graduate  ---  0.197 
     
Mother’s education: high school graduate  0.341  --- 
     
Mother’s education: some college  0.265  --- 
     
Mother’s education: college graduate  0.185  --- 
     
Father’s education: high school graduate  0.257  --- 
     
Father’s education: some college  0.191  --- 
     
Father’s education: college graduate   0.201  --- 
     
Sample size  363,622  293,350 
Data for children aged 14 or less and unmarried, childless adults aged 18-64 from 1991-2001 CPS March Annual Demographic 
File representing insurance coverage years 1990-2000.  Standard deviations in parentheses.   
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Appendix Table C: Child Sample, First stage MSA-Level OLS regressions of determinants of UC and Eligibility  
  Hospital UC  FQHC UC  Medicaid Eligibility 
  No FE  State FE  MSA FE  No FE  State FE  MSA FE  No FE  State FE  MSA FE 
Simulated eligibility  –79.394***  –22.761***  –25.418***  –1.522**  0.225  0.178  0.936***  0.964***  1.024*** 
  (10.226)  (6.746)  (6.170)  (0.659)  (0.445)  (0.359)  (0.026)  (0.032)  (0.019) 
Hospital tax appropriation   0.730***  0.679***  0.311***  0.0056***  0.0028  0.0027  –0.00006  –0.00005  –0.00011 
  per capita  (0.387)  (0.033)  (0.0565)  (0.0017)  (0.0021)  (0.0034)  (0.00004)  (0.00004)  (0.00009) 
State DSH per capita  0.069***  0.015  –0.003  0.003***  0.001  0.002*  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  (0.027)  (0.042)  (0.036)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
UC Pool expense per capita  0.311***  0.252***  0.091  –0.005  0.003  –0.002  0.000  0.000  0.000** 
  (0.066)  (0.095)  (0.098)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
FQHC federal grants  2.229***  0.142  0.020  0.744***  0.717***  0.549***  0.002***  0.001  0.001 
  per capita  (0.438)  (0.303)  (0.330)  (0.038)  (0.037)  (0.054)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001) 
FQHC state/local grants  0.541  1.041  0.783  0.078  0.076  0.095  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  per capita  (0.700)  (0.707)  (0.852)  (0.096)  (0.061)  (0.068)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
FQHC other grants per  –3.173*  0.890  –0.373  0.296  –0.121  0.053  0.002  0.002  –0.003 
  Capita  (1.825)  (1.530)  (1.014)  (0.306)  (0.191)  (0.173)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
State surplus per capita  –8.332**  2.630  6.031  0.739***  0.067  0.050  0.009  0.014  0.010 
  ($1000s)    (4.226)  (5.068)  (3.751)  (0.267)  (0.257)  (0.202)  (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.008) 
Democratic upper house  10.668***  –0.761  1.286  –0.269***  0.161  0.274**  0.009**  0.002  0.013** 
  (2.401)  (3.710)  (2.173)  (0.088)  (0.142)  (0.126)  (0.004)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
Democratic lower house  9.779***  4.747*  5.117***  –0.169  0.142  0.124  0.002  0.004  0.001 
  (2.901)  (2.810)  (1.919)  (0.156)  (0.123)  (0.102)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.004) 
Democratic governor  0.910  –5.539**  –2.877  0.307*  –0.284**  –0.318***  –0.003  –0.002  –0.006 
  (2.578)  (2.782)  (1.874)  (0.169)  (0.117)  (0.105)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
Fraction voting Democratic  60.201***  117.647***  –57.032  0.005  1.245*  1.998  0.003  0.037  0.039 
  for president (state)  (12.194)  (12.231)  (42.637)  (0.662)  (0.637)  (2.792)  (0.022)  (0.024)  (0.071) 
Medicaid managed care   –10.354*  –23.007***  –18.702***  2.105***  1.272***  0.697*  0.035***  0.015  0.027** 
  Penetration  (5.478)  (6.654)  (5.706)  (0.366)  (0.366)  (0.406)  (0.010)  (0.013)  (0.012) 
HMO penetration rate  –54.099***  –14.950*  3.379  –1.344**  –1.825***  –0.333  –0.034***  –0.042***  –0.014 
  (8.716)  (7.728)  (7.840)  (0.540)  (0.442)  (0.512)  (0.012)  (0.016)  (0.019) 
Per capita income ($1000s)  0.053  1.359***  –0.241  0.066**  –0.024  0.078  –0.005***  –0.004***  –0.004** 
  (0.353)  (0.370)  (0.887)  (0.031)  (0.019)  (0.057)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002) 
Unemployment rate (%)  –1.678***  1.651**  0.546  0.206***  0.187***  0.087  0.006***  0.007***  0.006*** 
  (0.561)  (0.660)  (0.917)  (0.037)  (0.037)  (0.062)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002) 
Joint F-stat for instruments  60.56  61.14  5.88  47.43  41.74  11.85  125.46  88.63  104.60 
Regressions also include demographic variables, age dummies, year dummies, and state/MSA fixed effects (where indicated).  N=182,152; coverage years 1990-2000 for children 
14 and under.  Regressions control for MSA-year clustering. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** indicates p<0.01, ** indicates 0.05<p<0.01, * indicates 0.10<p<0.05.  
 